Bottle Neck image - Aircraft Lovers Group

Given the size of that convoy I'm gonna say yes.

By that point in the war the Germans would've known better than to take the risk of bottlenecking so many assets on a road like that given allied air superiority.

So they must've been pretty desperate.

Then provide evidence to back your points.

Any yahoo can come off spouting their opinion when they see fit, but very few if any at all ever provide a smidgen of evidence to support their claims.

You wanna talk allied air superiority, where the hell was the Luftwaffe at Hamburg? That place got bombed back to the stone age by allied bomber command. Where the hell was the Luftwaffe at Dresden, Bremen, and countless other cities during the campaign?

Tens of thousands of civilians and even military personnel killed. Where, in the hell was the Luftwaffe? Oh, that's right. Getting their rear ends handed to them by Allied air command. On more than 1 front may I add.

You see, if the Luftwaffe was at all capable of preventing those carpet bombings, and air strikes on their convoys out in the field. Then they would have. But they failed to, and Allied air command walked all over them. That wasn't just because of the experience of our war pilots, but the fact is we simply outproduced Germany in every capacity when it came to both craft and personnel.

Am I trying to justify everything that happened? Am I trying to say that it's good civilians ended up dead as a result of allied air attacks? No, I'm not. So don't you even dare try saying I ever did. I regret the loss of life during that war, over 60 million people are dead because of political and social shitstorms you wouldn't believe.

War is hell, and good people on both sides died. But the fact is, the Allied powers held the German Luftwaffe by the balls by the time we'd reached that point in the war at the falaise pocket. So please, spare me the bull.

You're talking about the effectiveness of their rockets and aircraft. Given that they "originally" weren't designed for the role of supporting the ground troops against German ground forces. No where, at all within that time of him speaking, does he at all cover the total statistics of how much German armor and vehicles were destroyed as a result of allied air attacks using those craft.

There's a pretty big difference between claiming what something was designed for and then how it actually fared when pressed into service.

He picks one specific instance of the Battle of the Bulge. Without providing actual sources to where he got his figures from, leaving me scratching my head...

43:40 Youtube.com

He says 62 tanks were claimed, only 4 found.
I'm going to assume, he's referencing a squadron.

The Battle of the Bulge was from the 16th of December 1944 to the 25th January 1945 when the Germans conducted their offensive.

From December 16, 1944, to January 16, 1945, according to the Army Air Forces’ official history, planes of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces destroyed 11,378 German transport vehicles, 1,161 tanks and other armored vehicles, 507 locomotives, 6,266 railroad cars, 472 gun positions, 974 rail cuts, 421 road cuts, and 36 bridges.

Additionally, the Germans initial attack force at the Battle of the Bulge was said to have included 1,214 tanks, tank destroyers, and assault guns. That armored support could most certainly increased as the battle went on.

He doesn't cover those statistics, he instead cherry picks one.

Am I supposed to take his word from a cherry picked instance that doesn't even cover the actual counts claimed? From sources I am not made aware of. Or am I supposed to go by what was actually reported by Air Command itself?

For me, I'm gonna stick with the official numbers.

Now that's better!

The first book you listed though goes into the details I'm looking for.

However, this comes to a debate as to in what way you'd consider a enemy armored unit "destroyed". If it's out out of action, or it's inexperienced crew frightened into leaving. Then would that not have the same desired tactical effect?

Afterall, that is one less tank shooting at you.

The greatest advantage of Close Air Support, was it's ability to ruin enemy morale. Ruining the effectiveness of a crew, is just as good as destroying the tank itself.

The propaganda perpetrated by allied air command against the Axis troops, combined with all the ordnance dropped when CAS came, was enough to have the desired effect. Even if all the units weren't destroyed but rather morale shattered causing them to leave the battlefield. Which, in retrospect cost the Germans just as bad leaving a functioning armored vehicle behind for the enemy.